927 lines
29 KiB
C
927 lines
29 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
|
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
|
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
|
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unit test for Cisco DTLS1_BAD_VER session resume, as used by
|
|
* AnyConnect VPN protocol.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is designed to exercise the code paths in
|
|
* http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/openconnect.git/blob/HEAD:/dtls.c
|
|
* which have frequently been affected by regressions in DTLS1_BAD_VER
|
|
* support.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that unlike other SSL tests, we don't test against our own SSL
|
|
* server method. Firstly because we don't have one; we *only* support
|
|
* DTLS1_BAD_VER as a client. And secondly because even if that were
|
|
* fixed up it's the wrong thing to test against - because if changes
|
|
* are made in generic DTLS code which don't take DTLS1_BAD_VER into
|
|
* account, there's plenty of scope for making those changes such that
|
|
* they break *both* the client and the server in the same way.
|
|
*
|
|
* So we handle the server side manually. In a session resume there isn't
|
|
* much to be done anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
|
|
/* On Windows this will include <winsock2.h> and thus it needs to be
|
|
* included *before* anything that includes <windows.h>. Ick. */
|
|
#include "e_os.h" /* for 'inline' */
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/bio.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
|
|
|
/* PACKET functions lifted from OpenSSL 1.1's ssl/packet_locl.h */
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
/* Pointer to where we are currently reading from */
|
|
const unsigned char *curr;
|
|
/* Number of bytes remaining */
|
|
size_t remaining;
|
|
} PACKET;
|
|
|
|
/* Internal unchecked shorthand; don't use outside this file. */
|
|
static inline void packet_forward(PACKET *pkt, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
pkt->curr += len;
|
|
pkt->remaining -= len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns the number of bytes remaining to be read in the PACKET
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline size_t PACKET_remaining(const PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
return pkt->remaining;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise a PACKET with |len| bytes held in |buf|. This does not make a
|
|
* copy of the data so |buf| must be present for the whole time that the PACKET
|
|
* is being used.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int PACKET_buf_init(PACKET *pkt,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Sanity check for negative values. */
|
|
if (len > (size_t)65536)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
pkt->curr = buf;
|
|
pkt->remaining = len;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns 1 if the packet has length |num| and its contents equal the |num|
|
|
* bytes read from |ptr|. Returns 0 otherwise (lengths or contents not equal).
|
|
* If lengths are equal, performs the comparison in constant time.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int PACKET_equal(const PACKET *pkt, const void *ptr,
|
|
size_t num)
|
|
{
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != num)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return CRYPTO_memcmp(pkt->curr, ptr, num) == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Peek ahead at 2 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in
|
|
* |*data|
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int PACKET_peek_net_2(const PACKET *pkt,
|
|
unsigned int *data)
|
|
{
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 2)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
*data = ((unsigned int)(*pkt->curr)) << 8;
|
|
*data |= *(pkt->curr + 1);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Equivalent of n2s */
|
|
/* Get 2 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
|
|
static inline int PACKET_get_net_2(PACKET *pkt,
|
|
unsigned int *data)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!PACKET_peek_net_2(pkt, data))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
packet_forward(pkt, 2);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Peek ahead at 1 byte from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
|
|
static inline int PACKET_peek_1(const PACKET *pkt,
|
|
unsigned int *data)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!PACKET_remaining(pkt))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
*data = *pkt->curr;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get 1 byte from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */
|
|
static inline int PACKET_get_1(PACKET *pkt, unsigned int *data)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!PACKET_peek_1(pkt, data))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
packet_forward(pkt, 1);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Peek ahead at |len| bytes from the |pkt| and store a pointer to them in
|
|
* |*data|. This just points at the underlying buffer that |pkt| is using. The
|
|
* caller should not free this data directly (it will be freed when the
|
|
* underlying buffer gets freed
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int PACKET_peek_bytes(const PACKET *pkt,
|
|
const unsigned char **data,
|
|
size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
*data = pkt->curr;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Read |len| bytes from the |pkt| and store a pointer to them in |*data|. This
|
|
* just points at the underlying buffer that |pkt| is using. The caller should
|
|
* not free this data directly (it will be freed when the underlying buffer gets
|
|
* freed
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int PACKET_get_bytes(PACKET *pkt,
|
|
const unsigned char **data,
|
|
size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, data, len))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
packet_forward(pkt, len);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Peek ahead at |len| bytes from |pkt| and copy them to |data| */
|
|
static inline int PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(const PACKET *pkt,
|
|
unsigned char *data,
|
|
size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data, pkt->curr, len);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Read |len| bytes from |pkt| and copy them to |data|.
|
|
* The caller is responsible for ensuring that |data| can hold |len| bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int PACKET_copy_bytes(PACKET *pkt,
|
|
unsigned char *data,
|
|
size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(pkt, data, len))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
packet_forward(pkt, len);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Move the current reading position forward |len| bytes */
|
|
static inline int PACKET_forward(PACKET *pkt, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
packet_forward(pkt, len);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a one-byte length, and stores
|
|
* the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|.
|
|
* Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with
|
|
* the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|.
|
|
* Upon failure, the original |pkt| and |subpkt| are not modified.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt,
|
|
PACKET *subpkt)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int length;
|
|
const unsigned char *data;
|
|
PACKET tmp = *pkt;
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(&tmp, &length) ||
|
|
!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*pkt = tmp;
|
|
subpkt->curr = data;
|
|
subpkt->remaining = length;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define OSSL_NELEM(x) (sizeof(x)/sizeof(x[0]))
|
|
|
|
/* For DTLS1_BAD_VER packets the MAC doesn't include the handshake header */
|
|
#define MAC_OFFSET (DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
|
|
|
|
static unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
|
|
static unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
/* These are all generated locally, sized purely according to our own whim */
|
|
static unsigned char session_id[32];
|
|
static unsigned char master_secret[48];
|
|
static unsigned char cookie[20];
|
|
|
|
/* We've hard-coded the cipher suite; we know it's 104 bytes */
|
|
static unsigned char key_block[104];
|
|
#define mac_key (key_block + 20)
|
|
#define dec_key (key_block + 40)
|
|
#define enc_key (key_block + 56)
|
|
|
|
static EVP_MD_CTX handshake_md5;
|
|
static EVP_MD_CTX handshake_sha1;
|
|
|
|
/* PRF lifted from ssl/t1_enc.c since we can't easily use it directly */
|
|
static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
|
|
int sec_len,
|
|
const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
|
|
const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
|
|
const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
|
|
unsigned char *out, int olen)
|
|
{
|
|
int chunk;
|
|
size_t j;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *prf_mac_key;
|
|
unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
size_t A1_len;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
|
|
prf_mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
|
|
if (!prf_mac_key)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, prf_mac_key))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
/* Reinit mac contexts */
|
|
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (olen > chunk) {
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
out += j;
|
|
olen -= j;
|
|
/* calc the next A1 value */
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else { /* last one */
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
memcpy(out, A1, olen);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(prf_mac_key);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
|
|
static int do_PRF(const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
|
|
const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
|
|
const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
|
|
unsigned char *out, int olen)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char out2[104];
|
|
int i, len;
|
|
|
|
if (olen > (int)sizeof(out2))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
len = sizeof(master_secret) / 2;
|
|
|
|
if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_md5(), master_secret, len,
|
|
seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3,
|
|
seed3_len, out, olen))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), master_secret + len, len,
|
|
seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3,
|
|
seed3_len, out2, olen))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
|
|
out[i] ^= out2[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static SSL_SESSION *client_session(void)
|
|
{
|
|
static unsigned char session_asn1[] = {
|
|
0x30, 0x5F, /* SEQUENCE, length 0x5F */
|
|
0x02, 0x01, 0x01, /* INTEGER, SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION */
|
|
0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, /* INTEGER, DTLS1_BAD_VER */
|
|
0x04, 0x02, 0x00, 0x2F, /* OCTET_STRING, AES128-SHA */
|
|
0x04, 0x20, /* OCTET_STRING, session id */
|
|
#define SS_SESSID_OFS 15 /* Session ID goes here */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x04, 0x30, /* OCTET_STRING, master secret */
|
|
#define SS_SECRET_OFS 49 /* Master secret goes here */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
};
|
|
const unsigned char *p = session_asn1;
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the randomly-generated fields into the above ASN1 */
|
|
memcpy(session_asn1 + SS_SESSID_OFS, session_id, sizeof(session_id));
|
|
memcpy(session_asn1 + SS_SECRET_OFS, master_secret, sizeof(master_secret));
|
|
|
|
return d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, sizeof(session_asn1));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Returns 1 for initial ClientHello, 2 for ClientHello with cookie */
|
|
static int validate_client_hello(BIO *wbio)
|
|
{
|
|
PACKET pkt, pkt2;
|
|
long len;
|
|
unsigned char *data;
|
|
int cookie_found = 0;
|
|
unsigned int u;
|
|
|
|
len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
|
|
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check record header type */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Version */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Skip the rest of the record header */
|
|
if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 3))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check it's a ClientHello */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Skip the rest of the handshake message header */
|
|
if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check client version */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Store random */
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check session id length and content */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2) ||
|
|
!PACKET_equal(&pkt2, session_id, sizeof(session_id)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check cookie */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt2)) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_equal(&pkt2, cookie, sizeof(cookie)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
cookie_found = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Skip ciphers */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Skip compression */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Skip extensions */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Now we are at the end */
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Update handshake MAC for second ClientHello (with cookie) */
|
|
if (cookie_found && (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&handshake_md5, data + MAC_OFFSET,
|
|
len - MAC_OFFSET) ||
|
|
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&handshake_sha1, data + MAC_OFFSET,
|
|
len - MAC_OFFSET)))
|
|
printf("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
|
|
|
|
(void)BIO_reset(wbio);
|
|
|
|
return 1 + cookie_found;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int send_hello_verify(BIO *rbio)
|
|
{
|
|
static unsigned char hello_verify[] = {
|
|
0x16, /* Handshake */
|
|
0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Seq# 0 */
|
|
0x00, 0x23, /* Length */
|
|
0x03, /* Hello Verify */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Length */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, /* Seq# 0 */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Fragment length */
|
|
0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
|
|
0x14, /* Cookie length */
|
|
#define HV_COOKIE_OFS 28 /* Cookie goes here */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
memcpy(hello_verify + HV_COOKIE_OFS, cookie, sizeof(cookie));
|
|
|
|
BIO_write(rbio, hello_verify, sizeof(hello_verify));
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int send_server_hello(BIO *rbio)
|
|
{
|
|
static unsigned char server_hello[] = {
|
|
0x16, /* Handshake */
|
|
0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* Seq# 1 */
|
|
0x00, 0x52, /* Length */
|
|
0x02, /* Server Hello */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x46, /* Length */
|
|
0x00, 0x01, /* Seq# */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x46, /* Fragment length */
|
|
0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
|
|
#define SH_RANDOM_OFS 27 /* Server random goes here */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, /* Session ID length */
|
|
#define SH_SESSID_OFS 60 /* Session ID goes here */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x2f, /* Cipher suite AES128-SHA */
|
|
0x00, /* Compression null */
|
|
};
|
|
static unsigned char change_cipher_spec[] = {
|
|
0x14, /* Change Cipher Spec */
|
|
0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* Seq# 2 */
|
|
0x00, 0x03, /* Length */
|
|
0x01, 0x00, 0x02, /* Message */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
memcpy(server_hello + SH_RANDOM_OFS, server_random, sizeof(server_random));
|
|
memcpy(server_hello + SH_SESSID_OFS, session_id, sizeof(session_id));
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&handshake_md5, server_hello + MAC_OFFSET,
|
|
sizeof(server_hello) - MAC_OFFSET) ||
|
|
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&handshake_sha1, server_hello + MAC_OFFSET,
|
|
sizeof(server_hello) - MAC_OFFSET))
|
|
printf("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
|
|
|
|
BIO_write(rbio, server_hello, sizeof(server_hello));
|
|
BIO_write(rbio, change_cipher_spec, sizeof(change_cipher_spec));
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Create header, HMAC, pad, encrypt and send a record */
|
|
static int send_record(BIO *rbio, unsigned char type, unsigned long seqnr,
|
|
const void *msg, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Note that the order of the record header fields on the wire,
|
|
* and in the HMAC, is different. So we just keep them in separate
|
|
* variables and handle them individually. */
|
|
static unsigned char epoch[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
|
|
static unsigned char seq[6] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
|
|
static unsigned char ver[2] = { 0x01, 0x00 }; /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
|
|
unsigned char lenbytes[2];
|
|
HMAC_CTX ctx;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX enc_ctx;
|
|
unsigned char iv[16];
|
|
unsigned char pad;
|
|
unsigned char *enc;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
|
|
seq[0] = (unsigned char)(seqnr >> 40);
|
|
seq[1] = (unsigned char)(seqnr >> 32);
|
|
#endif
|
|
seq[2] = (unsigned char)(seqnr >> 24);
|
|
seq[3] = (unsigned char)(seqnr >> 16);
|
|
seq[4] = (unsigned char)(seqnr >> 8);
|
|
seq[5] = (unsigned char)(seqnr);
|
|
|
|
pad = 15 - ((len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) % 16);
|
|
enc = OPENSSL_malloc(len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1 + pad);
|
|
if (enc == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Copy record to encryption buffer */
|
|
memcpy(enc, msg, len);
|
|
|
|
/* Append HMAC to data */
|
|
HMAC_Init(&ctx, mac_key, 20, EVP_sha1());
|
|
HMAC_Update(&ctx, epoch, 2);
|
|
HMAC_Update(&ctx, seq, 6);
|
|
HMAC_Update(&ctx, &type, 1);
|
|
HMAC_Update(&ctx, ver, 2); /* Version */
|
|
lenbytes[0] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8);
|
|
lenbytes[1] = (unsigned char)(len);
|
|
HMAC_Update(&ctx, lenbytes, 2); /* Length */
|
|
HMAC_Update(&ctx, enc, len); /* Finally the data itself */
|
|
HMAC_Final(&ctx, enc + len, NULL);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* Append padding bytes */
|
|
len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
do {
|
|
enc[len++] = pad;
|
|
} while (len % 16);
|
|
|
|
/* Generate IV, and encrypt */
|
|
RAND_bytes(iv, sizeof(iv));
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&enc_ctx);
|
|
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&enc_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, enc_key, iv, 1);
|
|
EVP_Cipher(&enc_ctx, enc, enc, len);
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&enc_ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* Finally write header (from fragmented variables), IV and encrypted record */
|
|
BIO_write(rbio, &type, 1);
|
|
BIO_write(rbio, ver, 2);
|
|
BIO_write(rbio, epoch, 2);
|
|
BIO_write(rbio, seq, 6);
|
|
lenbytes[0] = (unsigned char)((len + sizeof(iv)) >> 8);
|
|
lenbytes[1] = (unsigned char)(len + sizeof(iv));
|
|
BIO_write(rbio, lenbytes, 2);
|
|
|
|
BIO_write(rbio, iv, sizeof(iv));
|
|
BIO_write(rbio, enc, len);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(enc);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int send_finished(SSL *s, BIO *rbio)
|
|
{
|
|
static unsigned char finished_msg[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH +
|
|
TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH] = {
|
|
0x14, /* Finished */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x0c, /* Length */
|
|
0x00, 0x03, /* Seq# 3 */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x0c, /* Fragment length */
|
|
/* Finished MAC (12 bytes) */
|
|
};
|
|
unsigned char handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
|
|
|
|
/* Derive key material */
|
|
do_PRF(TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
|
|
server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
key_block, sizeof(key_block));
|
|
|
|
/* Generate Finished MAC */
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&handshake_md5, handshake_hash, NULL) ||
|
|
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&handshake_sha1, handshake_hash + EVP_MD_CTX_size(&handshake_md5), NULL))
|
|
printf("EVP_DigestFinal_ex() failed\n");
|
|
|
|
do_PRF(TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
|
|
handshake_hash, EVP_MD_CTX_size(&handshake_md5) + EVP_MD_CTX_size(&handshake_sha1),
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
finished_msg + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
return send_record(rbio, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 0,
|
|
finished_msg, sizeof(finished_msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int validate_ccs(BIO *wbio)
|
|
{
|
|
PACKET pkt;
|
|
long len;
|
|
unsigned char *data;
|
|
unsigned int u;
|
|
|
|
len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
|
|
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check record header type */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Version */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Skip the rest of the record header */
|
|
if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 3))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check ChangeCipherSpec message */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_MT_CCS)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* A DTLS1_BAD_VER ChangeCipherSpec also contains the
|
|
* handshake sequence number (which is 2 here) */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != 0x0002)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Now check the Finished packet */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check epoch is now 1 */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != 0x0001)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* That'll do for now. If OpenSSL accepted *our* Finished packet
|
|
* then it's evidently remembered that DTLS1_BAD_VER doesn't
|
|
* include the handshake header in the MAC. There's not a lot of
|
|
* point in implementing decryption here, just to check that it
|
|
* continues to get it right for one more packet. */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define NODROP(x) { x##UL, 0 }
|
|
#define DROP(x) { x##UL, 1 }
|
|
|
|
static struct {
|
|
unsigned long seq;
|
|
int drop;
|
|
} tests[] = {
|
|
NODROP(1), NODROP(3), NODROP(2),
|
|
NODROP(0x1234), NODROP(0x1230), NODROP(0x1235),
|
|
NODROP(0xffff), NODROP(0x10001), NODROP(0xfffe), NODROP(0x10000),
|
|
DROP(0x10001), DROP(0xff), NODROP(0x100000), NODROP(0x800000), NODROP(0x7fffe1),
|
|
NODROP(0xffffff), NODROP(0x1000000), NODROP(0xfffffe), DROP(0xffffff), NODROP(0x1000010),
|
|
NODROP(0xfffffd), NODROP(0x1000011), DROP(0x12), NODROP(0x1000012),
|
|
NODROP(0x1ffffff), NODROP(0x2000000), DROP(0x1ff00fe), NODROP(0x2000001),
|
|
NODROP(0x20fffff), NODROP(0x2105500), DROP(0x20ffffe), NODROP(0x21054ff),
|
|
NODROP(0x211ffff), DROP(0x2110000), NODROP(0x2120000)
|
|
/* The last test should be NODROP, because a DROP wouldn't get tested. */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx;
|
|
SSL *con;
|
|
BIO *rbio;
|
|
BIO *wbio;
|
|
BIO *err;
|
|
time_t now = 0;
|
|
int testresult = 0;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
SSL_library_init();
|
|
SSL_load_error_strings();
|
|
|
|
err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
|
|
CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
|
|
CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
|
|
|
|
RAND_bytes(session_id, sizeof(session_id));
|
|
RAND_bytes(master_secret, sizeof(master_secret));
|
|
RAND_bytes(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
|
|
RAND_bytes(server_random + 4, sizeof(server_random) - 4);
|
|
|
|
now = time(NULL);
|
|
memcpy(server_random, &now, sizeof(now));
|
|
|
|
sess = client_session();
|
|
if (sess == NULL) {
|
|
printf("Failed to generate SSL_SESSION\n");
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&handshake_md5, EVP_md5(), NULL) ||
|
|
!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&handshake_sha1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
|
|
printf("Failed to initialise handshake_md\n");
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLSv1_client_method());
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
|
printf("Failed to allocate SSL_CTX\n");
|
|
goto end_md;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT);
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, "AES128-SHA")) {
|
|
printf("SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() failed\n");
|
|
goto end_ctx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
con = SSL_new(ctx);
|
|
if (!SSL_set_session(con, sess)) {
|
|
printf("SSL_set_session() failed\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
|
|
rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
|
|
wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
|
|
|
|
BIO_set_nbio(rbio, 1);
|
|
BIO_set_nbio(wbio, 1);
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
|
|
SSL_set_connect_state(con);
|
|
|
|
/* Send initial ClientHello */
|
|
ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
|
|
if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
|
|
printf("Unexpected handshake result at initial call!\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (validate_client_hello(wbio) != 1) {
|
|
printf("Initial ClientHello failed validation\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
if (send_hello_verify(rbio) != 1) {
|
|
printf("Failed to send HelloVerify\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
|
|
if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
|
|
printf("Unexpected handshake result after HelloVerify!\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
if (validate_client_hello(wbio) != 2) {
|
|
printf("Second ClientHello failed validation\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
if (send_server_hello(rbio) != 1) {
|
|
printf("Failed to send ServerHello\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
|
|
if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
|
|
printf("Unexpected handshake result after ServerHello!\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
if (send_finished(con, rbio) != 1) {
|
|
printf("Failed to send Finished\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
|
|
if (ret < 1) {
|
|
printf("Handshake not successful after Finished!\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
if (validate_ccs(wbio) != 1) {
|
|
printf("Failed to validate client CCS/Finished\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* While we're here and crafting packets by hand, we might as well do a
|
|
bit of a stress test on the DTLS record replay handling. Not Cisco-DTLS
|
|
specific but useful anyway for the general case. It's been broken
|
|
before, and in fact was broken even for a basic 0, 2, 1 test case
|
|
when this test was first added.... */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(tests); i++) {
|
|
unsigned long recv_buf[2];
|
|
|
|
if (send_record(rbio, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, tests[i].seq,
|
|
&tests[i].seq, sizeof(unsigned long)) != 1) {
|
|
printf("Failed to send data seq #0x%lx (%d)\n",
|
|
tests[i].seq, i);
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tests[i].drop)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
ret = SSL_read(con, recv_buf, 2 * sizeof(unsigned long));
|
|
if (ret != sizeof(unsigned long)) {
|
|
printf("SSL_read failed or wrong size on seq#0x%lx (%d)\n",
|
|
tests[i].seq, i);
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
if (recv_buf[0] != tests[i].seq) {
|
|
printf("Wrong data packet received (0x%lx not 0x%lx) at packet %d\n",
|
|
recv_buf[0], tests[i].seq, i);
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (tests[i-1].drop) {
|
|
printf("Error: last test cannot be DROP()\n");
|
|
goto end_con;
|
|
}
|
|
testresult=1;
|
|
|
|
end_con:
|
|
SSL_free(con);
|
|
end_ctx:
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
end_md:
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&handshake_md5);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&handshake_sha1);
|
|
end:
|
|
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
|
|
|
|
if (!testresult) {
|
|
printf("Cisco BadDTLS test: FAILED\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ERR_free_strings();
|
|
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
|
|
EVP_cleanup();
|
|
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
|
|
CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err);
|
|
BIO_free(err);
|
|
|
|
return testresult?0:1;
|
|
}
|